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PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF 
U. S. SUBMISSION 2011-01 (BAHRAIN) 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Prior to 2011, Bahrain was widely considered a leader among the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries on labor matters.  Workers’ capacity to organize and collectively bargain had 
contributed to largely stable industrial relations and to a relatively well-paid work force with 
comparatively decent working conditions.  Workplace and employment discrimination targeting 
opponents of the Sunni monarchy and/or targeting the Shia majority was generally absent.  
Bahrain enjoyed relative social and political stability.  This changed with the events of 2011, 
described and analyzed in this report.  The United States believes that implementation by the 
Government of Bahrain of the recommendations in this report would go a long way towards 
restoring Bahrain’s more positive pre-2011 record and standing on labor relations. 
 
This report responds to U.S. Submission 2011-01 (Bahrain), filed by the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations on April 21, 2011, with the Office of Trade and 
Labor Affairs (OTLA) of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs.  
The submission alleges violation of the Labor Chapter of the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA), which has been in force since January 2006.   
 
The report concludes that the Government of Bahrain, in particular the Minister of Labor, has 
made significant efforts to ensure reinstatement of dismissed workers.  In this context, the 
Minister of Labor worked with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to establish a 
tripartite committee composed of himself, the Chamber of Commerce, and the General 
Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU).  All but a few hundred of the workers dismissed 
following the March 2011 general strike have now been reinstated.  However, the report also 
concludes that important components of the government’s response to the unrest that began in 
February 2011 appear to be inconsistent with Bahrain’s labor commitments under the FTA 
related to freedom of association and non-discrimination.  The report also notes the deterioration 
in the labor rights environment in Bahrain, marked by restrictions on trade union freedoms and 
political and sectarian-based discrimination against Shia workers.  The report recommends 
Consultations under the Labor Chapter of the FTA as an appropriate and formal step for the U.S. 
government to engage constructively with the Government of Bahrain on these critical labor 
rights issues.    
 
PURPOSE OF THE REPORT 
 
On June 10, 2011, the OTLA accepted U.S. Submission 2011-01 (Bahrain) and published its 
decision in a Federal Register notice on June 16, 2011.
1
  During the course of its review, the 
OTLA has examined extensive documentation provided by the Government of Bahrain, the 
submitters, and others with direct knowledge of relevant events.  Additionally, the OTLA 
                                                 
1
 76 Fed. Reg. 35244 (June 16, 2011).   
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conducted two visits to Bahrain to gather additional information on the issues raised in the 
submission, as well as on subsequent allegations that arose during the course of the OTLA’s 
review.  The OTLA has consulted with the U.S. Department of State and the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative throughout the review process.  This report presents the OTLA’s findings 
and recommendations based on the information obtained in accordance with the OTLA’s 
Procedural Guidelines.    
 
SUMMARY OF U.S. SUBMISSION 2011-01 (BAHRAIN) 
 
U.S. Submission 2011-01 (Bahrain) alleges the Government of Bahrain has failed to uphold its 
commitments under Article 15.1 of the FTA.  The primary allegations include: 
 
 trade unionists and, in particular, trade union leaders have been targeted for dismissal 
and, in some cases, prosecution, in part for their role in organizing and participating in 
the March 2011 general strike; and  
 widespread dismissals after the March 2011 strike reflected discrimination based, in part, 
on political opinion and activities.  
 
The OTLA received additional allegations during its review of the submission, including that 
many of the dismissals following the March 2011 general strike were also discriminatorily based, 
in part, on workers’ religious (sectarian) identities.  The OTLA took these allegations into 
account in its review of the submission. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Under Article 15.1.1 of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, “The Parties reaffirm their obligations as 
members of the ILO and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998).”  Furthermore, each Party “shall strive 
to ensure that such labor principles,” including freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of discrimination in employment 
and occupation, and “the internationally recognized labor rights set forth in Article 15.7, are 
recognized and protected by its law.”2  Likewise, under Article 15.1.2, each Party “shall strive to 
ensure that its laws provide for labor standards consistent with the internationally recognized 
labor rights set forth in Article 15.7 and shall strive to improve those standards in that light.”3  
 
Based upon its review, the OTLA has concluded that the Government of Bahrain appears to have 
acted inconsistently with its commitments under Article 15.1 of the FTA.  In particular, the 
OTLA finds that: 
 
 Bahrain appears to have acted inconsistently with its commitments by failing (1) to strive 
to ensure that freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively 
are recognized and protected by its law; (2) to strive to ensure that its labor laws provide 
                                                 
2
 United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, Article 15.1.1 (hereinafter “U.S.-Bahrain FTA”). 
3
 U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Article 15.1.2. 
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for standards consistent with the rights of association and to organize and bargain 
collectively; and (3) to strive to improve such standards.  Specifically, the Government of 
Bahrain has not remedied shortcomings in its legal framework governing freedom of 
association, either by enacting reforms recommended by the ILO Committee on Freedom 
of Association or otherwise; actively applied or did not prevent or discourage employers 
from invoking these provisions to retaliate against organizers, supporters, or participants 
in the March 2011 general strike; and enacted labor law amendments that weaken 
protection of freedom of association.  In particular, the Government of Bahrain: 
 
o did not remedy and applied or supported the application of its bans on trade 
unions engaging in political activities; on public sector union formation; and on 
strikes in broadly defined “strategic undertakings”;  
o did not remedy and applied its criminal sanctions for engaging in or encouraging 
strikes in the public sector or in undertakings related to public services or public 
service requirements;      
o amended the Trade Union Law to ban multi-sectoral labor federations, prohibit 
individuals convicted of violating criminal laws leading to trade union or 
executive council dissolution from holding union leadership posts, and require the 
Minister of Labor to select the labor organization to represent Bahraini workers in 
international fora and in national-level bargaining. 
 
 Bahrain appears not to have fulfilled its commitments by failing to strive to ensure that 
the principle concerning the fundamental right of elimination of discrimination in 
employment and occupation is recognized and protected by its law.  Specifically, the 
Government of Bahrain has taken no steps to reform its labor law to directly ban 
discrimination in employment and occupation; and after the March 2011 general strike 
directly engaged in discrimination on the basis of political opinion and/or religion in the 
public sector and failed to sanction such discriminatory practices by private sector 
employers.  
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Engage in Cooperative Labor Consultations 
 
According to the OTLA’s Procedural Guidelines for submissions, its public report shall include 
any recommendations made to the Secretary of Labor as to whether the United States should 
request consultations with another Party pursuant to Article 15.6.1 of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, as 
relevant and appropriate.  According to Article 15.6.1, such consultations may be requested 
“regarding any matter arising under this [Labor] Chapter.”  As discussed in this report, the 
allegations raised in U.S. Submission 2011-01 (Bahrain) against the Government of Bahrain, as 
well as subsequent events, directly concern matters under the Labor Chapter and whether the 
Government of Bahrain has upheld its FTA commitments, in particular with respect to freedom 
of association and the elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation under Article 
15.1.   
 
 iv 
The Government of Bahrain has instituted mechanisms to address many of the concerns in the 
submission, including reinstatement processes that have resulted in the rehiring of all but a few 
hundred of the workers dismissed in the context of the general strike of March 2011 and a 
tripartite committee that brought together the Ministry of Labor, labor leaders, and employers to 
resolve outstanding labor concerns through constructive engagement and dialogue.  While these 
efforts were a positive and critical first step, important concerns remain.  Therefore, the OTLA 
recommends to the Secretary of Labor that the Government of the United States request Labor 
Consultations under Article 15.6.1 of the FTA to consult with the Government of Bahrain on the 
matters raised in this report.  The OTLA further recommends to the Secretary that in fulfillment 
of the Parties’ obligation to “make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of 
the matter,” the Parties seek during Consultations to develop a plan of action to resolve the 
matters at issue, taking into consideration the recommendations set forth below.  
 
As a result of the findings above, the OTLA makes the following recommendations to guide 
consultations and facilitate compliance by the Government of Bahrain with its commitments 
under Article 15.1 of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA: 
 
 Explicitly prohibit discrimination in employment and occupation in its labor law, 
including based on political opinion and religion;  
 
 Repeal the ban on multi-sectoral labor federations; 
 
 Amend the bans on public sector union formation, on trade unions engaging in 
political activities, on strikes in “strategic undertakings,” and on individuals who 
have been convicted of any violations that lead to dissolution of a trade union or 
executive council from holding union leadership posts, to ensure consistency with 
international standards; 
 
 Amend criminal sanctions for striking or encouraging others to strike in the public 
sector or in undertakings related to public services or public service requirements, 
consistent with international standards; 
 
 Allow workers’ organizations to select the most representative labor organization 
to represent them in international fora and national-level collective bargaining;   
 
 Implement the commitments of the Minister of Labor’s February 2012 plan and 
the Government of Bahrain’s Tripartite Agreement, to the maximum extent 
possible, to ensure reinstatement of workers dismissed in response to the March 
2011 strike to the same or equivalent positions without preconditions or 
discrimination and with back pay due and other remuneration owed or another 
appropriate compensation package;
4
  
                                                 
4
 See: “Bahraini Government Announces Finalizing Reinstatement of Dismissed Workers,” Bahrain News Agency, 
March 4, 2012, http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/497115; “Tripartite Agreement concerning the issues raised in the 
framework of the Complaint concerning the non-observance by Bahrain of the Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), made by delegates to the 100
th
 Session (2011) of the International Labour 
 
 v 
 
 Review all criminal cases against trade unionists and union leaders and drop 
outstanding  charges for those whose charges do not consist of advocacy of 
violence and stem from organizing, participating in, or encouraging the March 
2011 general strike, consistent with the Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry recommendation on such cases;
5
 
 
 Refrain from engagement in or support of activities undermining freedom of 
association, in particular against the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions 
and its leadership;    
 
 Investigate allegations of and sanction, as appropriate, employer acts of 
intimidation and harassment of trade union members and leaders and other similar 
employer actions to weaken workers’ organizations. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
Conference under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution” [hereinafter “Tripartite Agreement”], March 11, 2012, 
available as an Appendix to ILO CFA Case 2882 (Bahrain), Interim Report No. 364, June 2012 at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:3063453; and 
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry Report, p. 408, paragraph 1667 and p. 425, paragraph 1723. 
Information on the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, including the full report, is available at 
http://www.bici.org.bh/. (hereinafter BICI Report). 
5
 BICI Report, p. 424, paragraph 1722 (h). 
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I. Introduction 
 
Prior to the entry into force of the United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the 
Government of Bahrain expressed its commitment to improved labor rights in Bahrain.  In a 
November 2005 letter from Bahrain’s Ministry of Finance to the United States Trade 
Representative, the Minister cited significant political and economic reforms in Bahrain and 
stated, “The Government of Bahrain recognizes the importance of making progress on labor 
rights and we are in the process of amending many of our labor laws to be consistent with 
international standards.”6 
 
The events of early 2011, the issues raised by the submission under review, information gathered 
by the Department of Labor’s Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) during its review 
process, and the Government of Bahrain’s initial efforts but incomplete progress toward 
resolving those issues, however, raise concerns regarding the Government of Bahrain’s respect 
for international labor standards, in particular freedom of association and discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation.  As a result, this report, which covers events and related 
information received up to August 15, 2012, recommends steps to address outstanding problems 
in both of these areas. 
 
A. Submission Filed Under the United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement 
 
1. Summary of the Submission and Subsequent Allegations 
 
On April 21, 2011, the OTLA of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)’s Bureau of International 
Labor Affairs (ILAB) received a public submission under Chapter 15 (the Labor Chapter) of the 
FTA from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO).  U.S. Submission 2011-01 (Bahrain) alleges the Government of Bahrain has failed to 
uphold its FTA commitments under Article 15.1 regarding international labor rights, in particular 
those relating to freedom of association and discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.  In its submission, the AFL-CIO requests that the United States invoke its right 
under Article 21.5.2 of the FTA to withdraw from the Agreement (after providing 180 days 
notice) and, in the interim, enter into Labor Consultations with the Government of Bahrain under 
Article 15.6.1. 
   
The primary allegations in the submission are that: 
 
 trade unionists and, in particular, trade union leaders have been targeted for dismissal 
and, in some cases, prosecution, in part for their role in organizing and participating in 
the March 2011 general strike; and  
 widespread dismissals after the March 2011 strike reflected discrimination based, in part, 
on political opinion and activities.    
 
                                                 
6
 Letter from the Kingdom of Bahrain’s Minister of Finance, Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Khalifa, to U.S. Trade 
Representative, Ambassador Robert Portman, November 10, 2005. 
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In support of these allegations, the AFL-CIO cites cases of six General Federation of Bahrain 
Trade Unions (GFBTU) leaders who were dismissed as well as cases of other union leaders who 
were dismissed and, in some cases, arrested and prosecuted for their activities during the political 
unrest in Bahrain in early 2011. 
 
The OTLA received additional allegations during its review of the submission, including that 
many of the dismissals following the March 2011 general strike were also discriminatorily based, 
in part, on workers’ religious (sectarian) identities.  The OTLA took these allegations into 
account in its review of the submission.     
 
2. Relevant Provisions under the Labor Chapter of the Free Trade Agreement  
 
The FTA entered into force on August 1, 2006.  Under Article 15.1.1, “The Parties reaffirm their 
obligations as members of the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) and their commitments 
under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up 
(1998) (“ILO Declaration”).”  Under Article 15.1.1, each Party “shall strive to ensure that such 
labor principles,” which include, inter alia, freedom of association and the effective recognition 
of the right to collective bargaining and the elimination of discrimination in employment and 
occupation, “are recognized and protected by its law.”  Article 15.1.1 also states that each Party 
“shall strive to ensure that … the internationally recognized labor rights set forth in Article 15.7 
“are recognized and protected by its law.”  Article 15.7 includes the right of association and the 
right to organize and bargain collectively.  Likewise, under Article 15.1.2, each Party “shall 
strive to ensure that its laws provide for labor standards consistent with the internationally 
recognized labor rights set forth in Article 15.7 and shall strive to improve those standards in that 
light.”7  
 
B. Office of Trade and Labor Affairs Review of the Submission 
 
The Labor Chapter of the FTA states that each Party shall establish an office within its labor 
ministry to serve as a contact point with the other Parties and with the public.
8
  In the case of the 
United States, the OTLA was designated as the contact point in a Federal Register notice issued 
on December 21, 2006.
9
  Under the Labor Chapter, each Party’s contact point shall provide for 
the submission, receipt, and consideration of communications on matters related to the 
provisions of the Chapter, as well as review such communications in accordance with domestic 
procedures.
10
 
 
1. Office of Trade and Labor Affairs Procedures for Receiving Submissions  
 
The 2006 Federal Register notice informed the public of the Procedural Guidelines that the 
OTLA would follow for the receipt and review of such public submissions.  According to the 
definitions contained in the Procedural Guidelines, a “submission” means “a communication 
                                                 
7
 U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Article 15.1.2. 
8
 Ibid., Article 15.4.2. 
9
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006). 
10 
U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Article 15.4.2. 
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from the public containing specific allegations, accompanied by relevant supporting information 
that another Party has failed to meet its commitments or obligations arising under a labor 
chapter.”11 
 
On June 10, 2011, the OTLA accepted U.S. Submission 2011-01 (Bahrain), determining that it 
met the criteria for acceptance, and published its decision in a Federal Register notice on June 
16, 2011.
12
   
 
2. Office of Trade and Labor Affairs Procedures for Reviewing Submissions  
 
Under its Procedural Guidelines, the OTLA shall issue a public report within 180 days of the 
acceptance of a submission for review unless circumstances as determined by the OTLA require an 
extension of time.
13
  The objectives of the review are to gather information to assist the OTLA to 
better understand and publicly report on the issues raised by the submission.  On December 29, 2011, 
the OTLA issued a Federal Register notice indicating that it was extending the period of review for 
the submission against the Government of Bahrain.
14
 
 
Throughout the review process, the OTLA has consulted with the U.S. Department of State, the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and the U.S. National Security Staff.  The 
OTLA requested additional information from the Government of Bahrain, the submitters and 
others with direct knowledge of events in Bahrain.  In response, the submitters have provided 
numerous documents, primarily from the GFBTU, including copies of dismissal letters, strike 
notifications, statistics, and lists of dismissals and reinstatements.  The Government of Bahrain 
provided written responses to questions from the OTLA on June 20, 2011, and on December 16, 
2011, and provided additional information throughout this period, as well.    
 
The OTLA has reviewed the documentation provided by the Government of Bahrain, the 
submitters, and from others with direct knowledge of relevant events.  Additionally, the OTLA 
conducted two visits to Bahrain to gather additional information on the issues raised in the 
submission.  From October 23-27, 2011, four representatives from DOL’s ILAB and officials 
from the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain met with workers and union leaders from 22 public, private 
and quasi-governmental enterprises, senior management of six companies, and Bahraini 
                                                 
11 71 Fed. Reg. 76691, Section B (Dec. 21, 2006). 
12
 76 Fed. Reg. 35244 (June 16, 2011).  The Procedural Guidelines state that the OTLA shall consider six factors, to 
the extent that they are relevant, in determining whether to accept a submission for review.  These are as follows: (a) 
whether the submission raises issues relevant to any matter arising under a labor chapter; (b) whether a review 
would further the objectives of a labor chapter; (c) whether the submission clearly identifies the person filing the 
submission, is signed and dated, and is sufficiently specific to determine the nature of the request and permit an 
appropriate review; (d) whether the statements contained in the submission, if substantiated, would constitute a 
failure of the other Party to comply with its obligations or commitments under a labor chapter; (e) whether the 
statements contained in the submission or available information demonstrate that appropriate relief has been sought 
under the domestic laws of the other Party, or that the matter or a related matter is pending before an international 
body; and (f) whether the submission is substantially similar to a recent submission and significant, new information 
has been furnished that would substantially differentiate the submission from the one previously filed. 71 Fed. Reg. 
76691 (Dec. 21, 2006).   
13
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006).   
14
 76 Fed. Reg. 81984 (December 29, 2011). 
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government officials.
15
  Two OTLA officials and a representative of the Department of State’s 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor conducted a follow-up visit from February 7-9, 
2012, to gather updated information on the status of dismissals and reinstatements.  The OTLA 
also reviewed supplemental information submitted by the Government of Bahrain, AFL-CIO, 
GFBTU, workers, and other stakeholders, including multiple human rights organizations. 
 
3. Other Relevant Processes Addressing Labor Rights in Bahrain  
 
During the period of the OTLA’s review of this submission, labor rights issues were examined 
by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), established by the Government of 
Bahrain in June 2011.  In addition, two labor-related complaints against Bahrain were filed with 
the supervisory mechanisms of the ILO.  
 
The Government of Bahrain established the BICI composed of international jurists tasked with 
investigating and reporting on the events of February and March 2011.  The BICI was 
established by Royal Decree in June 2011.  The BICI released a public report on November 23, 
2011, including a section entitled, “Termination of Public and Private Sector Employment.”16  
Following the release of the BICI report, the Government of Bahrain established a National 
Commission to follow-up on the report’s recommendations.  The National Commission issued its 
report to the King on March 20, 2012, and has made it available to the public through its web 
site.
17
  Section II(E) of this report provides further information on the implementation of BICI 
recommendations. 
 
The first ILO complaint was filed on June 16, 2011, under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution by 
12 worker delegates to the 100
th
 Session of the International Labor Conference.  This complaint 
alleges that Bahrain violated provisions of ILO Convention 111 on discrimination in 
employment and occupation and seeks the establishment of a special high-level Commission of 
Inquiry, reserved for the most serious violations of ratified conventions.
18
     
                                                 
15
 The OTLA interviewed the following affected parties:   
- workers and union leaders from 22 private, public and quasi-governmental enterprises:  Aluminium 
Bahrain, American Express, Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard, Bahrain Airport Services, Bahrain 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Bahrain International Circuit, Bahrain National Gas Company, 
Bahrain Petroleum Company, Bahrain Telecommunications Company, General Federation of Bahrain 
Trade Unions, Gulf Air, Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company, New York Institute of Technology, Ritz-
Carlton Hotel, Bahrain Bourse, Central Bank of Bahrain, Information Affairs Authority, Ministry of 
Health, Ministry of Municipalities Affairs and Urban Planning, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education, 
and University of Bahrain; 
- representatives of four government ministries: Civil Service Bureau, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Labor; and 
- senior management of six companies: Aluminium Bahrain, Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Bahrain Petroleum Company, Bahrain Telecommunications Company, Gulf Air, and the Gulf 
Petrochemical Industries Company. 
16
 BICI Report.  
17
 National Commission report, March 20, 2012. Available at the National Commission’s web site: 
http://www.biciactions.bh (hereinafter National Commission Report). 
18
 International Labour Conference, Complaint under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution against the Government of 
Bahrain, Provisional Record No. 30, 100
th
 Session, June 16, 2011.   
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At its November 2011 meeting, the ILO Governing Body (ILO GB) deferred consideration of the 
Article 26 complaint until March 2012 to allow Bahrain to implement its proposal to establish a 
tripartite committee composed of representatives from the Ministry of Labor, the GFBTU, and 
the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI), to address the matter.  In early March, 
the tripartite committee signed an agreement concerning the issues in the complaint, which 
Bahrain submitted to the Director General of the ILO as the first promised progress report.  In 
light of these developments, at its March meeting, the ILO Governing Body again suspended 
consideration of the Article 26 complaint until November 2012, with a request that Bahrain 
continue to provide reports on implementation of the tripartite agreement.  The work of the 
tripartite committee is discussed further in Section II of this report.  
 
The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and its affiliates, including the GFBTU, 
submitted a second ILO complaint, to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (ILO 
CFA), on November 10, 2011.  The ILO CFA complaint is based on the same events as U.S. 
Submission 2011-01 (Bahrain).  The ILO CFA issued interim conclusions and recommendations 
in June 2012, and the case remains open.
19
 
                                                 
19
 International Labour Office, Governing Body, reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association, 312
th
 
Session, Geneva, November 2011.  Examination of Case No. 2882 (Bahrain) was deferred until the next meeting of 
the Committee.  
 6 
II. Overview of Events in Bahrain 
 
A. Protests and Demonstrations in Bahrain: February and March 2011 
 
In the wake of protests in Egypt and Tunisia, calls for political, social and economic reform in 
Bahrain emerged in early 2011.  Many of these calls were circulated through online fora and 
social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter.  A Facebook page called “February 14th 
Revolution in Bahrain” was established calling for widespread protests on February 14.20  
Demonstrations took place throughout Bahrain on February 14 and police and protesters clashed 
violently.  The first protester killed was Mr. Ali Abdulhadi Almeshaima, a death which the BICI 
report concluded was the result of excessive force by police.
21
 
 
On February 15, Mr. Almeshaima’s funeral procession, which started at the Salmaniya Medical 
Complex (SMC), drew a large number of mourners who were confronted by police.  A clash 
with police resulted in a second death, that of Mr. Fadhel Ali Matrouk, which the BICI also 
attributed to the excessive use of police force.
22
  This second death heightened public anger and 
increased the size of demonstrations at the SMC, as well as at a roundabout in central Manama, 
then known as the Pearl Roundabout, where protesters began to erect tents.  SMC medical staff 
also put up a tent to treat wounded demonstrators.
23
  As the number of demonstrators and 
mourners at the Roundabout reached several thousand, King Hamad ordered that processions be 
allowed to occupy the Roundabout to mourn the deaths.
24
 
 
Later on February 15, the GFBTU issued a statement offering condolences to families of the two 
individuals killed in the unrest and calling for full respect for freedom of expression, the right to 
protest peacefully, and the release of those detained during the protests.  The GFBTU also called 
for national dialogue with the participation of social partners to calm the situation and to address 
employment and wage issues.
25
  That same evening, King Hamad gave a televised address in 
which he reaffirmed the right of Bahrainis to peacefully exercise their right to freedom of 
expression.
26
  The statement of the King and the restraint of the police forces at the former Pearl 
Roundabout were welcomed in a February 16 statement by the GFBTU, which also called for an 
Extraordinary Meeting of the GFBTU Central Council on February 17.
27
 
 
In the early morning hours of February 17, the police commenced an operation to remove all 
demonstrators from the former Pearl Roundabout.  It is estimated that approximately 1,500 
demonstrators were staying in tents at the Roundabout and, according to the Ministry of Interior, 
over 1,000 security forces were sent to remove them and their tents.
28
  In the clearing of the 
Roundabout, police fatally wounded four individuals, and these deaths were later characterized 
                                                 
20
 BICI Report, p. 65, paragraph 188.  
21
 Ibid., pp. 228 - 229, paragraphs 896-900. 
22
 Ibid., p. 230, paragraph 905. 
23
 Ibid., p. 71, paragraph 215. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 “Statement by General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions,” February 15, 2011. 
26
 BICI Report, p. 71, paragraph 217. 
27
 “Statement of the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (2) on Recent Events,” February 16, 2011. 
28
 BICI Report, p. 73, paragraph 229. 
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by the BICI as the result of “unnecessary and disproportionate” use of force against civilians.29  
The Ministry of Interior reported that over 50 demonstrators suffered various injuries and 47 
police officers were wounded in the confrontation.
30
 
 
The decision to clear the former Pearl Roundabout led to additional protests, including attempts 
to return to the Roundabout.  At the SMC, protesters, including medical staff, commenced 
demonstrations in the SMC parking lot.
31
   
 
On February 17, the GFBTU issued another statement condemning the use of force against 
peaceful protesters and calling on the political leadership to intervene immediately to stop the 
violence and to respect the right to protest peacefully.
32
  The statement also noted that “the 
participants confirmed that the meeting of the Central Council and the heads of trade unions in 
permanent session [were prepared to] take the necessary steps, including the call for general 
strike.”33   
 
The Bahrain Teachers’ Society (BTS) issued a strike call on February 17, asking teachers to 
participate in a strike outside of school premises on February 20.
34
  The BTS also asked parents 
not to send their children to school to avoid the risk of injury in the event that the planned strike 
triggered a confrontation with security forces.
35
 
 
On February 17, the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) announced that armed BDF units had been 
deployed to the capital of Bahrain, Manama, and affirmed that the BDF was prepared to take 
punitive actions to restore stability and called on individuals to avoid gathering in certain areas.
36
   
 
Clashes between protesters and security forces, including police and the BDF, continued until 
relative calm was restored mid-day on February 19, when security forces withdrew from the 
former Pearl Roundabout and demonstrators were again allowed to access the area.
37
  The Crown 
Prince appeared on television that evening and announced that the King had issued a decree 
calling for a national dialogue.
38
  
 
On February 19, the GFBTU issued a statement that, while the Crown Prince’s call for dialogue 
was welcome, the Federation was calling for a general strike (excluding workers in essential 
humanitarian services) beginning on February 20 “to protect citizens and their safety.”39  The 
strike call demanded the “immediate withdrawal of the army from the streets and the respect of 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., p. 166, paragraphs 659-660. 
30
 Ibid., p. 74, paragraph 233. 
31
 Ibid., p. 75, paragraph 241. 
32
 “Statement of the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions and presidents of trade unions on the brutal attack 
on demonstrators in the Pearl Roundabout,” February 17, 2011. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 BICI Report, p. 75, paragraph 241. 
35
 Ibid., p. 79, paragraph 257. 
36
 Ibid., p. 75, paragraph 237. 
37
 Ibid., p. 81, paragraph 264. 
38
 Ibid., p. 82, paragraph 273. 
39
 “Statement Issued by the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions,” February 19, 2011.   
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fundamental rights to freedom of expression and to demonstrate peacefully as an enabling 
condition for dialogue, and without having to face force from the security forces.”40   
 
On the afternoon of February 19, the BDF General Command announced that armed units had 
been ordered to return to their bases.
41
  In light of that development, the GFBTU announced on 
February 20 that the general strike was suspended, lasting only one day, calling for workers to 
return to work the following day on February 21.
42
   
 
The BTS strike, however, which began on February 20, remained in effect until it was suspended 
on February 23, with an announcement from the BTS that teachers were to return to work on 
February 24.  The announcement called on the Ministry of Education not to retaliate against 
teachers and staff who had participated in the strike and noted that BTS would continue to 
organize demonstrations outside of school hours.
43
  
 
Over the next few weeks, there were continuing demonstrations in Bahrain, mostly organized by 
various political societies and student groups.  In early March, some of these events began to 
trigger violent confrontations between supporters of the government and opposition protesters, as 
well as sectarian clashes between Shia and Sunnis.  By March 13, the general security situation 
in Bahrain had deteriorated significantly, as there were numerous clashes between protesters and 
security forces, as well as between residents of various communities, and heightened tension due 
to the spread of information about assaults and vandalism.  In this climate of insecurity, citizen 
groups from various neighborhoods and villages began to organize roadblocks, checking 
identities of travelers and preventing unknown individuals from entering certain areas.
44
 
 
B. General Strike and Declaration of State of National Safety 
 
On March 13, the GFBTU responded to the deteriorating security situation, escalating tensions, 
and violence in the country by issuing a call for a second general strike, stating: 
 
The General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions hereby declares a general strike 
as of today, March 13, 2011 due to the security repercussions and social 
aggravations against the civil safety as a result of the excessive force employed by 
security forces in dispersing the sit-in gatherings near the Financial Harbor and 
Pearl Roundabout and the incidents in different locations all over the country.  
Unidentified individuals were instigated by some entities leading to several 
casualties.  The General Federation considers this as breaches and violations of 
human rights and international agreements ratified by the Kingdom of Bahrain. 
 
                                                 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 BICI Report, p. 82, paragraph 270. 
42
 “Statement of the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions Regarding Suspension of the General Strike,” 
February 20, 2011. 
43
 BICI Report, p. 331, paragraph 1342. 
44
 Ibid., p. 126, paragraph 468. 
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The General Federation demands that all the political forces and the civil 
institutions of society join forces and consolidate their efforts in order to reach a 
final solution to save the country and the people from more aggravation and 
tensions, and from being ensnared in the vicious circle of casualties and more 
bloodshed.
45
  
 
In interviews with the OTLA, representatives of the GFBTU and several enterprise-level unions 
underscored that the general strike call was, in important part, an attempt by workers through 
collective action to defend themselves and their interests in the face of a declining security 
situation.  It was not, they claimed, “purely political,” contrary to what the Government of 
Bahrain asserted to the OTLA in June 2011.
46
  The BICI report also cited workers’ efforts to 
defend themselves from the deteriorating security situation as one motive behind the strike.    
 
The BICI report explained:  
 
The calls by various labour and trade unions to strike were related, at least in part, to concerns for 
the safety and mistreatment of workers, calls for an improvement in the socio-economic 
conditions of their members and their families, and assurances against retaliation against 
participating members, pursuant to the purposes outlined under Article 20 of Decree Law No. 33 
of 2002.
47
 
 
On March 13, King Hamad requested military assistance from the GCC.
48
  On March 14, the 
GCC Peninsula Shield force entered Bahrain, beginning with troops from Saudi Arabia and 
followed by troops from the United Arab Emirates and the State of Qatar.
49
   
 
On March 15, King Hamad declared a three-month State of National Safety, authorizing security 
forces to search and arrest individuals suspected of disturbing public order, to restrict public 
gatherings and the dissemination of certain types of information, and to regulate the activities of 
individuals and organizations suspected of subversive activities.
50
  The State of National Safety 
remained in effect until it was lifted on June 1, 2011, and according to the Government of 
Bahrain, during its implementation, all laws remained in effect, including the labor and trade 
union laws.
51
 
 
                                                 
45
 “Statement of the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions,” March 13, 2011 (translation by the U.S. 
Department of State). 
46
 Government of Bahrain, “Response of the Government of Bahrain to the Public Submission Filed by the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) Under the Bahrain-United 
States Free Trade Agreement”, submitted to the OTLA, June 20, 2011, p. 15 (hereinafter Government of Bahrain 
response, June 20, 2011).  The Government of Bahrain told the OTLA, specifically, that the “demand related to the 
strike call was the replacement of the government and the overthrow of the regime.” 
47
 BICI Report, p. 353, paragraph 1448. 
48
 Ibid., p. 132, paragraph 490. 
49
 Ibid., p. 134, paragraph 501. 
50
 Government of Bahrain, Royal Decree No. 18 for the year 2011 to declare a State of National Safety, March 15, 
2011. 
51
 Government of Bahrain response, June 20, 2011, p. 9. 
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On March 16, Bahraini security forces commenced operations to remove demonstrators from the 
former Pearl Roundabout, the Financial Harbor, and from the SMC.  At the Roundabout, 
demonstrators clashed with security forces using tear gas and sound bombs to disperse the 
crowds.  Shortly after government forces regained control of the area, two police officers were 
killed nearby after being struck multiple times by a demonstrator’s vehicle.52  There were also 
reports of several civilian fatalities over the course of the day.   
 
Over the next several days, security forces carried out numerous arrests of opposition figures.
53
 
The security environment became increasingly fragile as the government established security 
checkpoints throughout Bahrain and both violent pro- and anti-government actors carried out 
acts of vigilantism.  Security forces conducted searches of vehicles and mobile phones, detaining 
individuals accused of possessing “anti-government” materials.  Checkpoint searches, both 
official and unofficial, were reportedly often accompanied by mistreatment at the hands of 
security personnel, including physical abuse (kicking, shoving, and beating with batons) and 
verbal abuse based on religious and sectarian beliefs.
54
 Some workers in transit to and from work 
were particularly impacted by the general security situation on the roads from March 13 to 20.  
Some directly faced violence, while others were afraid to travel due to the threat of insecurity, as 
described to the OTLA by former employees from: Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company 
(GARMCO), alleging a company bus transporting workers was stolen, forcing 22 employees to 
walk to work; Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), alleging several workers were assaulted 
and injured during their commute to work; Bahrain Telecommunications Company 
(BATELCO), alleging that over half of the employees were prevented from attending work due 
to lack of safety on the roads; Bahrain Airport Services (BAS) and Gulf Air, citing particular 
difficulties in travel to the airport; Bahrain National Gas Company (BANAGAS), alleging 
security conditions prevented workers from even leaving their houses and reporting that several 
BANAGAS employees were assaulted by mobs of unknown civilians; the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, 
where one employee provided evidence that his car had been shot during his commute to work; 
and the New York Institute of Technology, citing general insecurity on the roads preventing a 
safe commute.
55
   
 
On March 20, the GFBTU announced that it was extending the March 13 general strike 
indefinitely, with the Secretary General stating, “Workers are scared to go out to work as there 
are checkpoints everywhere, and in some cases they are questioned unnecessarily by 
authorities.”56  
 
Over the next few days, security conditions improved, though there were still checkpoints and 
sporadic clashes between demonstrators and security forces, and on March 22, the GFBTU 
announced that it was suspending the general strike and called for workers to return to work on 
March 23.  In its statement suspending the strike, the GFBTU noted that it received assurances 
                                                 
52
 BICI Report, p. 144, paragraph 533 and p. 227, paragraph 884 (in which the BICI attributes the police officers’ 
deaths to demonstrators). 
53
 Ibid., p. 147, paragraph 552. 
54
 Ibid., p. 150, paragraph 564. 
55
 OTLA interviews with dismissed workers (various), October 2011 and February 2012. 
56
 BICI Report, p. 155, paragraph 589. 
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from unspecified government officials “concerning an end to the attacks, assaults and insults 
against the workers, which had prevented the workers from getting to and from their work places 
safely.”  The GFBTU urged workers to coordinate with their unions to document any assaults 
during their work commute and called upon all workers to “preserve the social fabric, national 
unity and solidarity in the current circumstances.”57  The GFBTU also called on public ministries 
and private institutions to be understanding of the “extraordinary circumstances in the country in 
order to protect the rights of all workers.”58  
 
On March 23, the security situation in Bahrain was reported to be continuing to improve, 
although demonstrations continued, as government offices and many private businesses resumed 
normal activity.
59
     
 
C. Widespread Dismissals Following Unrest in Bahrain 
 
In the weeks and months after the March 2011 protests and general strike, thousands of workers, 
including union leaders, were dismissed, and in some cases suspended, from their jobs in a wide 
range of businesses, varying in size and sector of activity.  Based on comments by senior 
government officials quoted in media reports at the time, such dismissals appear to have received 
high-level support.
60
   
 
Workers interviewed by the OTLA, however, asserted that the dismissals were unjustified and 
unlawful.  They claimed that the dismissals were largely motivated by discrimination on the 
basis of political opinion and/or religion and/or were retaliation for legitimate trade union 
activities, and they noted that employers often provided multiple discriminatory grounds for each 
dismissal.  They further alleged that trade union leaders were discriminatorily and 
disproportionately targeted first for dismissal, prior to their rank-and-file counterparts.  And they 
noted that the dismissals generally failed to follow mandatory legal dismissal procedures, such as 
providing prior notice and allowing workers to participate in their investigations.  In particular, 
employers regularly cited prolonged absenteeism as the basis for dismissal without following the 
legal requirements for such dismissals.
61
  In doing so, they appeared to contradict clear Ministry 
of Labor guidance, issued in the context of the March 2011 general strike, which underscored 
that employers must warn workers of possible dismissals after five days of absence; must 
investigate and determine whether the absenteeism was “without reasonable cause” before 
dismissing workers; and, in this case, must factor in security conditions during the March 2011 
                                                 
57
 “Statement of the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions Regarding the General Strike,” March 22, 2011.  
Translated by U.S. Department of State. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 BICI Report, p. 156, paragraph 599. 
60
 See, e.g., “All Criminal Acts will be Punished,” Gulf Daily News, April 18, 2011, available at http://www.gulf-
daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=304045.  
61
 Article 113(4) of Bahrain’s Labour Law for the Private Sector allows for dismissal “if the worker absents himself 
without reasonable cause for more than twenty days in one year or for more than ten consecutive days,” provided 
that such dismissal is preceded by the appropriate warning.  Government of Bahrain, Labour Law for the Private 
Sector, 1976, Article 113(4) (hereinafter Labour Law).   
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general strike into the “reasonable cause” analysis.62  The Prime Minister’s Special Committee 
chaired by the Minister of Labor that reviewed all reported cases of wrongful dismissals found 
that “[m]any of these cases related to the political events of the period, while a significant 
number did not.”63 
 
In some cases, dismissals seemingly motivated by discrimination were also preceded by arrest 
and detention, allegedly facilitated by the employer or agents of the employer, and by torture.   
 
1. Dismissals in the Private Sector 
 
The Ministry of Labor informed the OTLA during the review visit to Bahrain in February 2012 
that a total of 2,462 private sector employees were dismissed following the unrest.
64
  The official 
dismissal figures from the Government of Bahrain are included in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Private Sector Dismissal Statistics from the Government of Bahrain
65
 
 
 
 
The highest concentration of private sector dismissals occurred in the large parastatal 
institutions, which account for a significant portion of Bahrain’s economy.  While classified as 
private sector and falling under the jurisdiction of the Labour Law, many of these companies are 
held by the Kingdom of Bahrain’s investment company, Mumtalakat, created by Royal Decree in 
                                                 
62
 “Rules and Guidelines of Dismissal from Service according to the Provisions of the Labour Law for the Private 
Sector Promulgated by Legislative Decree No. (23) for 1976, as Amended,” (undated) provided to OTLA by the 
Ministry of Labor during the meeting in October 2011. 
63
 Government of Bahrain response to OTLA questions, received via email on December 16, 2011. 
64
 The GFBTU, however, reported 2,241 private sector workers dismissed.  One possible explanation for the higher 
figure presented by the Government of Bahrain is that the Ministry of Labor’s figures include workers whose 
employers notified the Ministry of their intent to dismiss specific workers, who were ultimately not dismissed.  The 
Ministry of Labor told OTLA that there were approximately 300 workers who fell into this category.  Additionally, 
the Ministry of Labor has reported that 201 workers did not file complaints with the Ministry regarding their 
dismissals, and it is possible that these workers also did not approach the GFBTU to register their cases. 
65
 Government of Bahrain, Information Affairs Authority, BICI Follow-Up Unit: Follow-Up Report, June 2012, p. 9. 
Company 
Number of Workers 
Dismissed 
Aluminium Bahrain 541 
Bahrain Petroleum Company 316 
APM Terminals 256 
Gulf Air 224 
Bahrain Telecommunications Company 172 
Bahrain Airport Services 88 
Bahrain National Gas Company 68 
Arab Shipbuilding & Repair Yard 64 
Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company 36 
Others 697 
Total 2,462 
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2006.  Mumtalakat holds stakes in 35 companies, often referred to as the “major companies” or 
“public-private” companies, with a portfolio value of approximately US$9.1 billion.66   
 
2. Dismissals in the Public Sector 
 
Shortly after the suspension of the general strike on March 23, the Government of Bahrain called 
for an examination of worker absences from public ministries during the period of the general 
strike.  Specifically, on March 27, while chairing the weekly Cabinet meeting, the Prime 
Minister ordered all government ministries and departments to “strictly enforce Civil Service 
regulations,” particularly with regards to work attendance and performance during that time.  
Additionally, the Prime Minister ordered all government institutions to submit reports on 
employees’ compliance with applicable regulations over that period.67   
 
Over the course of the next several weeks and months, public sector workers were suspended and 
dismissed from a variety of ministries and other government entities.  Over 200 civil servants 
were also referred to the Public Prosecutor’s office for investigation into alleged criminal acts 
during the period of unrest.  According to the Civil Service Bureau (CSB), responsible for 
processing public sector dismissals, as of mid-December 2011, 2,075 cases had been referred to 
the CSB with a recommendation for dismissal from the employing ministry.  Of those, over half 
(roughly 1,275) were from the Ministry of Education, representing the largest group of public 
sector workers facing disciplinary action for their strike participation.
68
  On March 23, the 
Ministry of Education announced the establishment of committees to investigate the events that 
led to the disruption of classes in February and March 2011 and to determine whether, in that 
context, any ministry employees had violated Civil Service Regulations governing their 
employment.
69
 
 
As of December 2011, the CSB reported that of 2,075 public sector workers referred to them, 
they had finalized 180 dismissals and imposed ten-day suspensions without pay for an additional 
1,631 civil servants.
70
  The Government of Bahrain reaffirmed these numbers in the March 2012 
Tripartite Agreement.
71
  The majority of cases were from the Ministries of Education (1,275 of 
the cases referred with 79 dismissed and 1,014 recommended for suspension) and Health (337 of 
the cases referred with 36 dismissed and 237 suspended).
 72
  
 
The actual number of dismissed public sector workers has been the subject of ongoing dispute, as 
other bodies have gathered information inconsistent with the statistics provided by the CSB.  The 
BICI, which collected testimony from dismissed workers, stated that BICI investigators had 
                                                 
66
 For more information on the Mumtalakat companies, see http://www.bmhc.bh/default.aspx.  
67
 “Bahrain Clamp Down on Absent Employees”, Trade Arabia, Business News Information, March 28, 2011, 
http://www.tradearabia.com/news/LAW_195842.html.  See also, BICI Report, p. 157, paragraph 624. 
68 These disciplinary actions against teachers appear to be largely directly related to the two teachers’ strikes 
occurring on February 20-24 and March 14-24, 2011.   
69
 BICI Report, p. 157, paragraph 603. 
70
 Government of Bahrain response to OTLA questions, received via email on December 16, 2011. 
71
 Tripartite Agreement, p. 3. 
72
 Ibid., Appendix B. 
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received statements from 465 public sector workers reporting that they had been dismissed and 
another 355 workers who reported being suspended.
73
  The GFBTU also collected information 
on public sector dismissals, which was inconsistent with CSB statistics.  According to the 
GFBTU, 246 public sector workers were dismissed, while 415 were suspended.
74
   
 
3. Dismissals from Quasi-Governmental Institutions 
 
Dismissals also occurred in quasi-governmental institutions, including the University of Bahrain, 
Bahrain Polytechnic University, the Shura Council (the national legislature that acts in an 
advisory capacity only), and the Bahrain Bourse (Bahrain's regulatory agency for securities and 
official stock market).
75
  These employers do not fall under the purview of the Ministry of Labor 
or the CSB and, for that reason, do not appear to have been captured in the public sector statistics 
that the Government of Bahrain provided to the OTLA.   
 
In interviews with workers, the OTLA collected limited data on this category of workers.  
Regarding the University of Bahrain, academics reported that 19 faculty members were 
dismissed and an additional 66 staff members were either dismissed or suspended.
76
  Shura 
Council staff members alleged there were “systematic dismissals” of 20 employees, and workers 
from the Bahrain Bourse reported to the OTLA that four employees were fired from the 
company after the March 2011 general strike.
77
 
 
D. Targeted Dismissals 
 
1. Targeted Dismissals Based on Union Leadership 
 
In its submission to the OTLA, the AFL-CIO alleged that “prominent trade union leaders have 
been specifically targeted for firing . . . for their role in organizing and participating in strikes 
and demonstrations.”  The submission reported that six members of the Executive Board of the 
GFBTU and 22 leaders of enterprise-level trade unions had been dismissed in the wake of the 
March 2011 general strike.  That number of trade union members and leaders dismissed 
reportedly increased since the submission was filed on April 21, 2011.  A complaint to the ILO 
CFA filed by the GFBTU and others on November 10, 2011 included the following statistics of 
fired union leaders, provided in Table 3.
78
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75
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76
 “Summary List: Status of University of Bahrain Suspended/Dismissed as of January 30, 2012”, provided to the 
OTLA on February 8, 2012. 
77
 OTLA interviews with dismissed Shura Council staff, October 2011. 
78
 Complaint to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, filed by the ITUC, GFBTU, and Education 
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Table 2: Trade Union Officer Dismissals 
 
Trade Union 
Organization 
Number 
Dismissed 
General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions
79
 9 
Bahrain Petroleum Company Trade Union  10 
Bahrain Telecommunications Company Trade Union  3 
Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Trade Union  8 
Gulf Air Trade Union 3 
General Flight Attendants Union 3 
Hotels and Catering Union 1 
General Trading and Food Processing Company Union 3 
Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company Union 10 
Bahrain Aviation Fueling Company Union 1 
Bahrain National Gas Company Trade Union  1 
Bahrain Airport Services Trade Union  1 
Bankers Trade Union 1 
Sphinx Trade Union 3 
Bahrain Precast Concrete Company Trade Union 1 
Gulf City Cleaning Company Union  1 
Total 59 
 
In its response to the allegations in the AFL-CIO submission to the OTLA of discrimination 
against union leaders following the March 2011 general strike, the Government of Bahrain has 
stated, “There has been no effort directly or indirectly by the Government of Bahrain to 
encourage the dismissal of workers in general or any union officers or workers specifically.”80  
 
i. Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard (ASRY) 
 
According to workers at ASRY, dismissals commenced with the firing of all nine members of 
the Executive Board of the ASRY trade union on April 10, 2011.  Although ASRY ultimately 
dismissed a total of 64 workers for their participation in or absence related to the general strike, 
those dismissals occurred after the union leaders were fired.
81
  According to ASRY’s Human 
Resource manager, the dismissals of all ASRY Executive Board members were based on 
“disrupting work and calling for a general strike as a result of the political events in Bahrain.”82  
The grounds for dismissal in one union leader’s termination letter reviewed by the OTLA also 
                                                 
79
 The nine dismissed GFBTU members are from the following companies: BANAGAS (1); BAS (1); Aluminum 
Bahrain (ALBA) (1); BAPCO (2); BATELCO (3); and GARMCO (1). 
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cited primarily to the role of the union in the March 2011 general strike, indicating that union 
leaders had “committed a gross violation by inciting workers not to report for work, which 
disrupted the progress of work in the company, leading to significant losses.”83     
 
ii. Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) 
 
According to BAPCO union board members interviewed by the OTLA, dismissals at BAPCO 
commenced on March 31 with the firing of the union’s leader.  The following week, on April 6, 
an additional 11 members of the 15-member union board were dismissed, receiving letters that 
cited the union’s call for and participation in an illegal strike as the grounds for dismissal.  
BAPCO ultimately dismissed a total of 316 workers for their involvement in or absence during 
the general strike, but the other dismissals targeting non-union leaders did not occur until after 
the union leaders were dismissed.
84
   
 
In meetings with the OTLA, senior management of BAPCO confirmed that investigations into 
employee actions and attendance related to the March 2011 general strike initially targeted union 
leaders suspected of instigating the strike at BAPCO.  According to BAPCO management, the 12 
trade union leaders who admitted to calling for a strike were dismissed, while those three who 
denied involvement were not dismissed.
85
  
 
2. Targeted Dismissals Based on Political Affiliation and Activity 
 
The submission filed by the AFL-CIO also alleged that the “targeted dismissal of workers who 
have engaged in protest which is in part political in nature also violates the principles on non-
discrimination. . . .  In many cases, workers have been told at the time they were fired that the 
dismissals were due to participation in strikes and/or participation in pro-democracy rallies.”86  
Similarly, the June 16, 2011, complaint under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, filed by worker 
delegates to the 100
th
 Session of the International Labor Conference, alleged in relevant part that 
the widespread dismissals following the March 2011 general strike were based, at least in part, 
on political opinion.
87
   
 
In interviews with the OTLA, many workers from all sectors (public, private, and quasi-
governmental) described a political focus of the investigations leading up to their dismissals.  
Many alleged that they were fired, at least in part, in retribution for their political views and their 
suspected involvement in political activity outside the workplace, including attending political 
gatherings or otherwise demonstrating against the leadership of Bahrain.
88
  Workers described, 
for example, pre-dismissal investigations in which they were questioned about participation in 
protests at the former Pearl Roundabout and shown Facebook postings and photos as evidence of 
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their political dissent.
 89
  Some noted that they were fired the day after they were identified on 
state-run television as threats to the state.
90
   
 
Union leaders from Gulf Air told the OTLA that the company sent a circular soliciting photos 
and other evidence from employees that would show that their colleagues participated in political 
demonstrations.
91
  While the company denied sending out the circular, company officials 
acknowledged receiving a large number of photos from “volunteers” providing evidence of 
participation by fellow employees in political protests.
92
  In the case of the BCCI, several 
employees told the OTLA that they had been dismissed following colleagues’ allegations that 
they had “promoted hatred of the regime” in violation of BCCI policies.93   
 
The political tone, in many cases, of investigations that culminated in worker dismissals was 
particularly pronounced in the public sector.  In discussing their cases with the OTLA, dismissed 
Ministry of Education staff indicated that suspensions of teachers commenced in March, 
prompted in part by “volunteers” or colleagues who submitted photos, videos and other materials 
documenting participation in political demonstrations.  They further explained that the 
investigations that preceded their dismissals, conducted by the Ministries of Interior and 
Education, included repeated questions about the teachers’ political activities, generally, and 
attendance at demonstrations at the former Pearl Roundabout, in particular.
94
  Ministry of Health 
employees similarly described the dismissal procedures followed by the Ministry of Health, 
stating that the investigations consisted of a series of questions focused largely on their political 
activities and views.
95
  Likewise, workers dismissed from several other ministries told the OTLA 
that during investigation committee proceedings prior to their dismissal, they were also 
repeatedly asked questions about their participation in protests and their political views.  In one 
case, the investigation committee reportedly had photos of a worker at the former Pearl 
Roundabout, taken after work hours, and in others, investigation committees examined whether 
workers had expressed approval of the demonstrations on social networking sites, such as “like” 
on Facebook.
96
   
 
The CSB provided the OTLA information from a sample group of public sector dismissals.  
These documents demonstrated that disciplinary committees convened by the CSB repeatedly 
asked workers about their participation in demonstrations at the former Pearl Roundabout, 
political statements made to colleagues or posted on social networking sites such as Facebook or 
Twitter, and membership in political societies.
97
  When the OTLA asked the CSB about 
allegations that dismissed workers were questioned by CSB disciplinary committees about 
political activities outside of the workplace, in particular attendance and participation in 
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demonstrations at the former Pearl Roundabout, a CSB official noted that while workers might 
have been asked such questions, dismissals were not based on these activities.  The CSB official, 
however, did not provide an alternative basis for the terminations or an explanation for why such 
questions were asked by CSB disciplinary committees whose sole purpose was to review and 
approve or deny recommendations for dismissals from employing government ministries.
98
  
 
Dismissal processes in several quasi-governmental institutions, such as the University of 
Bahrain, appear to have followed a similar pattern, with employers basing employment 
decisions, at least in part, on political activities.  On March 13, 2011, protesters held a large 
demonstration at the university resulting in violent clashes between demonstrators and security 
forces.  Within several weeks, professors were called to meetings with university officials, 
during which an investigation committee questioned them on their political activities, including 
off-campus activities, such as their participation in demonstrations at the former Pearl 
Roundabout or other locations, political emails and postings on social networking sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter, political conversations with expatriate colleagues, and membership in 
political societies.
99
   
 
University of Bahrain academics interviewed by the OTLA reported that after the investigation 
committees’ proceedings, they were suspended and their cases transferred to the university 
disciplinary councils to determine whether they would be terminated.  While on suspension from 
work, several academics were taken into police custody for interrogation, where they were 
reportedly also threatened and physically abused.
100
   
 
On August 11, 2011, 19 academics were dismissed from the University of Bahrain.  The 
academics informed the OTLA in November 2011 that the University of Bahrain had agreed to 
reinstate eight of the 19 dismissed but that those reinstated would receive a “final warning,” 
which could indefinitely deprive them of certain rights related to promotion, nomination for 
study or research grants, and nomination for other administrative or academic positions.
101
  In 
March 2012, the national commission to implement the recommendations of the BICI reported 
that 17 of the 19 academics were reinstated and the remaining two did not return to the 
university, due to travel outside of Bahrain.
102
  The OTLA does not have specific information as 
to whether academics continued to receive “final warnings” upon reinstatement.  
 
University of Bahrain employees’ dismissal letters, obtained by the OTLA, specifically cited 
political activities as justification, at least in part, for dismissal.  In one letter, a University of 
Bahrain employee was notified that “it was proven to the Primary disciplinary council with 
actual evidence that you participated in an illegal gathering at the cooperative council in which 
                                                 
98
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99
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political slogans were raised denouncing the ruling system [of] the Kingdom of Bahrain, [sic] 
also you have been attending at the roundabout and participated in illegal political activities.” 103  
A second employee’s dismissal letter stated that “it was proven to the Primary disciplinary 
council that you have severely violated Articles 28, 29 and 30 of the list of rules and regulations 
of Bahrain University administrative employees by actually participating in demonstrations that 
call for the fall of the political and constitutional rule [of] the Kingdom of Bahrain, and deeply 
abusing your duties as a public civil servant working at a University with scientific and 
educational objectives that are remote from [the] political atmosphere.”104 
 
3. Targeted Dismissals Based on Religion 
 
Nearly all workers interviewed by the OTLA also alleged that dismissals were carried out along 
sectarian lines.  Dismissed workers, from all sectors, claimed that the burden of dismissals fell 
almost exclusively on Shia workers and that no Sunni staff had been dismissed.
105
  They 
commented that while there was no formal tracking of religious affiliation at the workplace, their 
examination of the lists of those dismissed indicated generally that Shia had been fired, while 
Sunni had not.
106
  One interviewed worker, who participated in the disciplinary proceedings at 
his company (prior to his own dismissal), indicated that the investigation committee at his 
company that reviewed absences exempted those employees “with Sunni names” from the 
company’s wave of dismissals.  The process, he explained, was marked with such blatant 
sectarian discrimination that the representatives from the legal department who served on the 
investigation committee stopped attending meetings as their input was ignored.
107
  According to 
other interviewed workers, dismissed Shia workers included several who had continued 
attending work during the unrest of early 2011 and workers who had had no history of work 
problems and had received positive performance feedback or had pending promotions.
108
  
Dismissals based on sect were also addressed in the BICI report, which found:  
 
Shia employees were often treated differently from similarly-situated employees who 
were not Shia, thus creating a reasonable presumption that many were subjected to 
discrimination.  This is the case especially in circumstances where the employer admitted 
not dismissing Sunni employees who had been absent during the events of 
February/March 2011.  This indicates an assumption that Shia employees who missed 
work during the events of February/March 2011 participated in the demonstrations and 
were subject to disciplinary action.
109
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E. Rehiring of Workers Dismissed Following Unrest in Bahrain  
 
Throughout 2011, the Government of Bahrain made repeated recommendations to private 
employers to reinstate workers expeditiously and reinstated many workers in the public sector.  
Despite these efforts, progress in resolving the dismissals following the March 2011 general 
strike was slow.  It was not until the first few months of 2012, nearly a year after the general 
strike, that a significant number of workers were reinstated.
110
  Although most terminated 
workers have now been reinstated, some cases still remain unresolved, with several hundred 
dismissed workers still without reinstatement or reemployment agreements.  For example, in 
some private and parastatal sectors, including banking, steel, and newspaper sectors, the GFBTU 
reported that it had received allegations of employers refusing to rehire the terminated 
workers.
111
   Some employers have told U.S. Embassy Manama this was in part due to the lack 
of available, appropriate positions or a breakdown in negotiations between the employer and 
worker.
112
  
 
Furthermore, of those workers who have been rehired, some have returned to inferior positions, 
some have not been fully compensated for their periods of unemployment, and some have been 
required to accept preconditions for re-employment that negatively impact their pay, benefits, 
and job security, all of which combine to create a climate of financial and job insecurity.  Some 
have reported being required to renounce any political or strike activity as an employment pre-
condition.  Some have alleged that anti-Shia discrimination is being reflected in hiring decisions 
regarding replacement workers, with some enterprises reportedly only hiring Sunni workers, 
even when they may lack the credentials or specific skills required for the job.
113
  In August 
2012, the GFBTU alleged a de facto “recruitment ban” on Shia, particularly in high-level 
positions, in large private and parastatal companies and in the public sector, where an important 
percentage of new high-ranking government officials are Sunni.
114
  Similarly, the ILO Article 26 
complaint filed by the worker delegates to the ILO similarly alleges that “new hiring processes 
are taking place with explicitly stated preference for specific workers based on such grounds as 
belief, trade union affiliation and national extraction” and are “marked by screening processes 
that discriminate on political and religious grounds.”115   
 
As a result, although the data indicate that most of the workers dismissed following the March 
2011 general strike have largely been reinstated, the reinstatement process raises serious 
concerns about workers’ freedom of association and discrimination based on political opinion 
and religious (sectarian) identity.  Workers have reported fears of retaliation and repercussions 
for engaging in associational activity, based largely on the anti-union activity that followed the 
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March 2011 strike.  They have further reported that the general lack of accountability for state 
security personnel alleged to have perpetrated violence and intimidation against dismissed 
workers has also contributed to a climate of fear in which workers continue to refrain from 
associational activity.  Fully addressing the 2011 terminations requires far more than mere 
unconditional reinstatement to equivalent posts with back pay and other remuneration owed.  It 
requires the restoration of a climate conducive to freedom of association and non-discrimination 
in employment and occupation, which has yet to be achieved. 
 
1. Rehiring of Workers in the Private Sector  
 
As the number of dismissals grew after the general strike of March 2011, the Government of 
Bahrain established a High Level Special Committee, composed of the Minister of Justice and 
Islamic Affairs, the President of the CSB, the President of the Legislation and Legal Opinion 
Commission, and chaired by the Minister of Labor.  The Committee was established on April 30, 
2011, and charged with reviewing whether private sector dismissals that occurred in the wake of 
that strike were consistent with applicable Bahraini laws and regulations.  By June 10, 2011, the 
Special Committee had received 1,635 cases for review and had recommended reinstatement for 
571 workers whose dismissals were deemed unlawful.  The Special Committee also found that 
approximately 150 dismissals were carried out lawfully, reported that nearly 350 cases had 
already resulted in settlements between workers and employers, and indicated that it was 
continuing to review the remaining cases.
116
  On June 16, the Ministry of Labor sent a letter to 
the GFBTU informing the Federation that the Special Committee had determined that 571 
dismissals were illegal and that the Ministry of Labor would be contacting the relevant 
companies requesting the reinstatement of these workers.
117
   
 
The Government of Bahrain has clarified, however, that the Special Committee had no legal 
authority to order reinstatement in such cases where dismissals were deemed to be illegal:   
 
It is important to make clear that under the law the Government has no authority to order 
reinstatements.  The power to remedy any wrongful employment dismissal is with the 
courts, not the executive branch.  Under the law, the courts can order compensation for a 
wrongfully dismissed worker, and can also order reinstatement (only) for trade union 
executive board members.
118
 (emphasis in original). 
 
On July 3, the Prime Minister directed the Committee to expedite its coordination with private 
sector companies in evaluating whether dismissals were lawful.  The Prime Minister also 
instructed the Committee to examine whether the terminated workers had committed crimes or 
were found to be in breach of their job duties.  Lastly, he instructed employers to reinstate, 
within ten days, all workers found by the Committee to have been wrongfully terminated and 
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who were not involved in criminal activity or failure to perform their employment duties.
119
  The 
Prime Minister’s reinstatement instructions, however, were also not legally binding. 
  
Based on the Special Committee’s findings and the Prime Minister’s reinstatement instructions, 
the Ministry of Labor issued non-binding directives to employers beginning in July, urging but 
not requiring, that they “reinstate the dismissed workers, who were found to have been dismissed 
illegally, who did not commit any criminal activities or who did not fail to perform their 
employment tasks and duties.”120  
 
The issues of private sector dismissals, as well as academic expulsions, following the March 
2011 general strike were also addressed by the King in his August 28, 2011, speech 
commemorating the last ten days of Ramadan.  Acknowledging the difficulties that had beset 
Bahrain in the preceding months, the King stated: 
 
Despite our full commitment to achieving security, safety and tranquility for our people, 
we do not want any prejudice to any of our citizens in their security, freedom, source of 
income or education, in a way that results in bitterness and that affects their contribution 
to the nation.  Our aspiration is for tolerance and for shunning violence, and not for 
excessive punishment that affects our unity…When we see workers at their place of work 
and students at their learning institutions, while some other workers are not working and 
some other students are not studying, we are prompted to look into their situation in order 
to help them join their colleagues and classmates.  Such an accomplishment will benefit 
the workers, the students, their families and the while nation.  These are our orders to the 
concerned institutions and they should implement them more quickly.
121
 (emphasis 
added). 
 
In response to the King’s speech, as well as the findings and recommendations of the Special 
Committee, the Council of Ministers issued an additional non-binding directive to “guarantee the 
fast implementation of the supreme royal directives to reinstate the dismissed and suspended 
workers, and to remove the impediments which had obstructed or delayed the reinstatement of 
those workers who were found [by the Committee] to have been dismissed without any proper 
legal justification.”122  
 
Despite the directives from the Council of Ministers and Ministry of Labor, the 
recommendations of the High Level Special Committee, the instructions of the Prime Minister, 
and the encouragement of the King to reinstate wrongfully dismissed workers expeditiously--
none of which were legally binding, the reinstatement process for the workers who were 
dismissed following the March 2011 general strike proceeded slowly.  According to the 
Government of Bahrain, by December 2011, only roughly 775 terminated workers from the 
                                                 
119
 “Prime Minister Urges Private Sector Sackings to be Reconsidered,” Bahrain News Agency, July 3, 2011, 
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/463524.  
120
 Ministry of Labor, Bahrain, letter to ALBA Chief Executive Officer, July 5, 2011. 
121
 “HM the King Speech on the Occasion of the Last Ten Days of the Holy Month of Ramadan,” Bahrain News 
Agency, August 28, 2011, http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/470288.  
122
 Ministry of Labor, Bahrain, letter to Seef Properties Director General, September 11, 2011. 
 23 
private sector had been reinstated, though the government statistics indicate a total of 2,462 
private sector employees had been fired. 
 
In apparent response to the slow progress, in February 2012, the Minister of Labor announced 
further plans to address private sector dismissals.  First, all dismissed workers from private 
companies, including parastatal enterprises, were to be reinstated without preconditions and 
regardless of the legality of their terminations.  Secondly, unemployment insurance benefits were 
to be paid retroactively to all dismissed workers.  On March 4, 2012, following a visit to Bahrain 
by a delegation from the ILO, the Minister of Labor announced that “procedures for reinstating 
dismissed workers were successfully finalized by the government.”123 
 
On March 11, 2012, also following the ILO visit, a tripartite committee—composed of 
representatives from the Ministry of Labor, the GFBTU, and the BCCI—signed an agreement, 
providing updated figures on reinstatements and committing to certain steps to address remaining 
cases of dismissals.  Specifically, the parties agreed to “continue their efforts to ensure the full 
reinstatement in both the public and private sectors of all the remaining workers to the maximum 
extent possible.”124  With regard to workers in the parastatal companies, the Government of 
Bahrain committed to the reinstatement of all workers.  With respect to workers in the “purely 
private sector,” the government and BCCI agreed to take “all necessary action to find alternative 
employment for the remaining workers who seek placements,”125 if denied reinstatement by their 
original employers.    
 
As of June 2012, the Government of Bahrain asserted that approximately 2,318 of the 2,462 
cases of dismissed workers in the private sector, including parastatal enterprises, had been 
resolved, with workers returning to their previous jobs, accepting similar jobs with other 
companies, or in the process of such reinstatement or reemployment.
126
  The Government of 
Bahrain’s figures on private sector reinstatements are included in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Dismissal and Reinstatement Statistics from the Government of Bahrain 
 
Company 
Workers 
Dismissed 
Workers 
Reinstated (or 
in Process of 
Reinstatement) 
Workers 
Employed 
Elsewhere, 
Retired, 
or 
Resigned 
Workers 
Nominated 
by the 
MOL to 
Join Other 
Companies 
Workers 
Choosing 
not to 
Return 
to 
Previous 
Job 
Workers 
Not Filing 
Complaints 
Reinstatement 
Rejected by 
Employers 
Aluminium Bahrain 541 493 48 0 0 0 0 
Bahrain Petroleum 
Company 
316 307 8 0 0 1 0 
APM Terminals 256 229 22 0 0 0 5 
Gulf Air 224 216 4 0 0 0 4 
Bahrain 
Telecommunications 
Company 
172 156 16 0 0 0 0 
Bahrain Airport 
Services 
88 64 12 0 4 5 3 
Bahrain National Gas 
Company 
68 67 1 0 0 0 0 
Arab Shipbuilding & 
Repair Yard 
64 61 2 0 1 0 0 
Gulf Aluminium 
Rolling Mill 
Company 
36 34 2 0 0 0 0 
Others 697 160 416 46 19 26 30 
Total 2,462 1,787 531 46 24 32 42 
 
 
The GFBTU has been critical of the reinstatement statistics provided by the Government, 
asserting that workers in the process of being but not yet fully reinstated are being counted as 
resolved and that some workers counted as reinstated have not yet been allowed to return to work 
or have returned to inferior positions.
127
  For their part, the Government of Bahrain and the BCCI 
have stated to the U.S. Embassy in Manama that the GFBTU continues to list employees that 
have already taken other jobs or were temporary workers.
128
  
 
In addition, despite the Minister of Labor’s February 2012 statement that all reinstatements 
should occur without preconditions, some employers have reportedly imposed prejudicial 
preconditions on reinstatement, including: issuing workers “final warnings,” which allow 
employers to terminate workers on short notice; requiring workers to sign new contracts or 
reinstatement agreements that waive claims for back pay or certain benefits associated with 
length of service, such as accrued leave or eligibility for promotions; and demanding that 
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workers sign “loyalty pledges” or other agreements to refrain from political activities or 
participation in strikes,
129
 which the Government of Bahrain has acknowledged are illegal.
130
       
 
2. Rehiring of Workers in the Public Sector  
 
As discussed above, government ministries in Bahrain referred a total of 2,075 workers to the 
CSB with recommendations of dismissal.  According to the CSB, of those cases, 180 public 
sector workers were initially dismissed, 1,631 received ten-day suspensions, and 218 were 
referred for prosecution and suspended pending the outcome of their legal cases.   
 
On December 20, 2011, Bahrain’s Information Affairs Authority issued a press release 
announcing that the Deputy Prime Minister and Vice Chairman of the Civil Service Council, 
Sheikh Khalid bin Abdullah Al-Khalifa, had issued an order reinstating the 180 dismissed public 
sector workers.  These workers were to return to work by January 1, 2012.  In the same release, 
the Chairman of the CSB indicated that all cases of public sector workers referred for 
prosecution would be examined by the Public Prosecutor and that these workers would continue 
to receive their salaries pending the results of the criminal investigations.
131
   
 
Nonetheless, in interviews with the OTLA in February 2012, several suspended public sector 
workers from the Ministries of Education and Health facing criminal investigations reported that, 
despite the CSB announcement, they had not been receiving their salaries.  In March 2012, 
however, the National Commission established to oversee the implementation of BICI 
recommendations reported that 179 of the 180 dismissed civil servants were effectively 
reinstated, with the remaining worker not returning to work because a criminal conviction had 
been handed down by the courts prior to the Government’s instruction to reinstate all dismissed 
workers.
132
          
 
3. Rehiring of Workers in Quasi-Governmental Institutions  
 
The OTLA has not been able to obtain a detailed accounting of the status of those workers 
dismissed from quasi-governmental institutions.  These workers, from entities such as 
universities, the Shura Council, and the Bahrain Bourse, are not included in the statistics of the 
Ministry of Labor or the CSB.  They also appear to have been excluded from reinstatement 
directives applying to dismissed workers from the public and private sectors.   
 
In February 2012, the OTLA interviewed several dismissed staff members and academics from 
the University of Bahrain, and they reported that reinstatements have been sporadic and often 
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accompanied by unfavorable preconditions, such as the issuance of “final warnings.”  At the 
time, the academics informed the OTLA that the University of Bahrain had agreed to reinstate 
nine of the 19 dismissed.
 133
  By late March, however, the National Commission reported that 17 
of the 19 academics had been returned to their jobs at the University of Bahrain, with the 
remaining two not returning due to travel outside the country.
134
  In August 2012, the GFBTU 
had begun to refer to the University of Bahrain, as well as the BCCI, as “excellent examples of 
reinstatement,” where workers had received back pay and other remuneration owed and been 
reinstated into their previous or equivalent posts.
135
    
 
F. Allegations of Further Anti-Union Activities Following Unrest in Bahrain  
 
In addition to the events directly linked to the widespread dismissals following the March 2011 
general strike, the OTLA has received and reviewed reports of other alleged anti-union conduct 
following the strike.  The ILO CFA characterized such complaints in its June 2012 Interim 
Report as “allegations of intimidation and harassment of trade union leaders and members.”136  
For example, the ILO CFA complaint refers to “an ongoing campaign in the media (on Bahraini 
TV channels, in particular) against the GFBTU and its leadership.”137  The complaint also cites 
anti-union activity at GARMCO, alleging that the employer has taken steps to weaken the union, 
including: breaking into union offices; threatening not to renew foreign workers’ employment 
contracts if they remain union members and then unilaterally withdrawing union recognition 
after 130 foreign workers resigned from the union; and barring trade union officials from the 
premises.
138
  In the Interim Report, the ILO CFA noted that “the Government of Bahrain had not 
yet replied” to these allegations and expressed “its deep concern” at the nature of these 
charges.
139
  The Committee indicated that it “expects the Government to transmit its observations 
on these allegations without delay and to ensure that sufficient measure are taken to protect trade 
unionists from such acts of intimidation and harassment.”140  
 
Both in the ILO CFA complaint and in interviews with the OTLA, union leaders have also 
asserted that GARMCO, as well as ASRY and BAS, unilaterally ceased deduction and transfer 
of dues for all union members, regardless of whether they were working, suspended, or fired, 
violating long-standing agreements between the unions and employers.
141
  In the cases of 
GARMCO and BAS, the employers have claimed that workers requested cancellation of dues 
deductions.  Even if that were the case, however, which union leaders dispute, the unilateral 
termination of dues collection violates the unions’ respective agreements with their employers, 
which require that employees wishing to withdraw from the union and cease paying dues first 
notify the unions of their resignations, which will then notify the employers.  In addition, the 
above-referenced complaint under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, alleged that that the hiring 
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processes established in the wake of the March 2011 general strike to replace fired workers have, 
in many cases, included requirements that workers pledge not to strike, as a precondition for 
employment.
142
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
142
 International Labour Conference, Complaint under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution against the Government of 
Bahrain, Provisional Record No. 30, 100
th
 Session, June 16, 2011. 
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III. Analysis of Submission Filed under the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement 
 
A. Freedom of Association 
 
The AFL-CIO submission alleges that Bahrain has failed to fulfill its commitments under Article 
15.1 of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA regarding freedom of association based on allegations that trade 
union leaders have been illegally targeted for dismissal and that widespread dismissals have been 
carried out in a discriminatory fashion, and on limits imposed under Bahraini law on legitimate 
trade union activity, including strikes and political action.  The submission cites the civil and, at 
times, criminal application of those limits in response to the March 2011 general strike as 
undermining freedom of association, noting in particular that “prominent trade union leaders . . . 
even face prosecution for their role in organizing and participating in strikes and 
demonstrations.”143   
 
Article 21(1) of Bahrain’s Trade Union Law recognizes the right to strike as a “legitimate means 
for defending workers’ economic and social interests.”144  Article 3 provides that trade union 
activities, including strikes, “shall not be used as a means and justification for discrimination in 
employment or influencing workers in any manner whatsoever.”145  Law No. 73 of 2006 
amended Article 110 of the Labour Law to specifically prohibit dismissal of workers due to their 
trade union activities, including strikes.  Under the Labour Law, workers fired for trade union 
activities are to be reinstated to their positions and compensated for the period that they were 
dismissed.
146
   
 
Bahraini law, however, also places significant limitations on freedom of association.  Such limits 
include a ban on public sector workers establishing unions, permitting only that civil servants 
join other unions in similar or related private sector professions or occupations;
147
 a general ban 
on trade unions from engaging in any “political activities;”148 a ban on strikes in “strategic 
undertakings;”149 and criminal penalties against civil servants for participating in or encouraging 
others to participate in strikes in the public sector or in undertakings related to public services or 
public service requirements.
150
  
 
The ILO CFA has expressed that normally public sector workers “should, like workers in the 
private sector, be able to establish organizations of their own choosing to further and defend the 
interests of their members.”151  The ILO CFA has also expressed that “[p]rovisions imposing a 
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general prohibition on political activities by trade unions for the promotion of their specific 
objectives are contrary to the principles of freedom of association,”152 noting, “If trade unions are 
prohibited in general terms from engaging in any political activities, this may raise difficulties by 
reason of the fact that the interpretation given to the relevant provisions may, in practice, change 
at any moment and considerably restrict the possibility of action of the organizations.”153    
 
The ILO CFA has recognized that the right to strike is “an intrinsic corollary to the right to 
organize” and “one of the essential means through which workers and their organizations may 
promote and defend their economic and social interests.”154  Although the right to strike may be 
limited in some cases, the ILO CFA has expressed that “arrests and imprisonment in connection 
with the organization of or participation in a peaceful strike . . . entail serious risks of abuse and 
are a grave threat to freedom of association.”155  The ILO CFA has “pointed out the danger for 
the free exercise of trade union rights of sentences imposed on representatives of workers for 
activities related to the defence of the interests of those they represent.”156 The circumstances in 
which the right to strike may be limited are narrowly defined and may also vary depending on 
country conditions.  For example, limitations on the right to strike are justified in cases of 
“strategic undertakings,” more commonly referred to as “essential services,” discussed below, 
understood as those services the interruption of which would present “a clear and imminent 
threat to the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of a population.”157    
  
1. Ban on Public Sector Workers’ Organizations 
 
Article 10 of the Trade Union Law bans public sector workers from establishing trade unions and 
permits them only to join other, pre-existing unions.
158
  Circular No. 1 of 2003 reiterates that 
trade unions are illegal in the public sector and that public sector workers wishing to join a union 
may only join other trade unions in similar or related private sector professions or occupations.
159
  
As a result, if public sector workers wish to organize themselves at the enterprise- or sector- or 
activity-wide level for the defense of their own interests, they are limited to establishing 
“associations” or “societies” regulated by the Ministry of Social Development and Human Rights 
and not covered by the Trade Union Law’s protections.  
 
In June 2005, the GFBTU filed a complaint with the ILO CFA alleging that the ban on public 
sector union formation violates freedom of association and is also a breach of Articles 27 and 28 
of the Bahrain Constitution and Article 5 of the National Charter, “which explicitly allows for 
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the right to organize of all workers without any distinction or discrimination.”160  Responding to 
the complaint, the ILO CFA recalled that all public sector workers, with the exclusive exception 
of the armed forces and police, should be allowed to establish their own organization to defend 
their members’ interests, and in its recommendations noted that it “expects that the legislative 
amendment allowing public sector workers and employees to establish trade unions of their 
choosing will be adopted and promulgated in the very near future.”161   
 
As a result of the ban on public sector trade unions, public sector medical professionals and 
teachers in Bahrain who wished to join together to defend their own particular interests 
established “societies,” the BTS and the Bahrain Medical Society (BMS), respectively.  As 
nongovernmental organizations rather than unions, however, these societies are not covered by 
the Trade Union Law, including the requirement that dissolution of trade unions and their Boards 
of Directors be “in accordance with the provisions of their Constitution or by a court 
judgment.”162  On April 6, 2011, following the teachers’ strike in March, the Ministry of Social 
Development and Human Rights dissolved the BTS.  The official news agency reported that the 
BTS “stands accused of calling for a strike at schools, disrupting educational establishments, in 
addition to manipulating school students, from all standards, to sow chaos.”163  Also in April, the 
Social Development Ministry suspended the Board of Directors of the BMS for “issuing 
statements and engaging into practices which flout the law on NGOs and its bylaw.”164   
 
The ban on public sector workers establishing trade unions included in Article 10 of the Trade 
Union Law is thus inconsistent with freedom of association.  By failing to address this 
inconsistency, either by following the ILO CFA recommendations or otherwise, and by applying 
or permitting the application of Article 10 following the March 2011 general strike, the 
Government of Bahrain appears  not to be fulfilling its commitments under Article 15.1.1 and 1.2 
of the FTA.   
 
2. Ban on Trade Union “Political Activities” 
 
Article 20(d) of the Trade Union Law includes a general ban on trade unions engaging in 
“political activities.”165   
 
A broad prohibition on unions engaging in political activities not only undermines freedom of 
association, it is impractical and subject to abuse.  As the ILO CFA has noted, “A general 
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prohibition on trade unions from engaging in any political activities would not only be 
incompatible with the principles of freedom of association, but also unrealistic in practice.  Trade 
unions may wish to express publicly their opinion regarding the government's economic and 
social policy.”166    
 
The Government of Bahrain has failed to address the incompatibility between Article 20(d) and 
freedom of association.  Instead, the government has invoked or did not prevent or discourage 
employers from invoking this article as legitimate grounds for dismissal.  In fact, the engagement 
of unionists in political activity was one of the many grounds for dismissal, as discussed in more 
depth below, cited by employers to justify the widespread terminations following the March 
2011 general strike.
167
   
 
By failing to address this incompatibility and in the wake of the March 2011 general strike, 
invoking or permitting employers to invoke Article 20(d) as legitimate grounds for dismissal, the 
Government of Bahrain appears not to be fulfilling its commitments under Article 15.1.1 and 1.2 
of the FTA.   
 
3. Ban on Strikes in “Strategic Undertakings” 
 
Under Article 21(2)(d) of the Trade Union Law, strikes were prohibited in “vital and important 
facilities that harm the national security and the life of individuals.”168  The scope of Article 
21(2)(d) was expanded by Act No. 49 of 2006 amending certain provisions of the Trade Union 
Law to prohibit strikes in “strategic undertakings, which may threaten national security, or 
disrupt the flow of daily life of citizens” and to provide that the Prime Minister will issue an 
order determining which services will be covered by the exclusion.
169
  Prime Minister’s Decision 
No. 62 of 2006 lists the services, which include: security services, civil defense, airports, ports, 
hospitals, medical centers and pharmacies, all means of transport of persons or goods, 
telecommunications, electricity and water services, bakeries, educational institutions, and the 
petroleum and gas sectors.
170
  
 
On February 22, 2007, the GFBTU submitted a complaint to the ILO CFA,
171
 alleging that the 
list of “essential services” in which strikes are prohibited under Bahraini law is overly broad and 
exceeds the scope of permissible limitations under international standards relating to freedom of 
association.  The ILO CFA agreed and requested the Government of Bahrain take the necessary 
steps to amend Article 21 of the Trade Union Law in order to “limit the definition of essential 
services to essential services in the strict sense of the term—that is, services the interruption of 
which would endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the whole or part of the population—
and to ensure that workers in services where the right to strike is restricted or prohibited are 
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afforded sufficient compensatory guarantees.”172  The Government of Bahrain has failed to 
address these inconsistencies with international standards, either by following the ILO CFA 
recommendations or otherwise. 
 
In the wake of the March 2011 general strike, employers at times based workers’ dismissals, at 
least in part, on their unlawful organization of or participation in a strike in a “strategic 
undertaking,” broadly defined under Bahrain law to encompass a wide range of sectors, 
including petroleum and gas (BAPCO and BANAGAS), airports (Gulf Air), and educational 
institutions.
173
  For example, in a meeting with the OTLA, senior management from Gulf Air 
noted that strikes are illegal in the sector and indicated that, as a result, some workers were 
dismissed based on participation in the general strike, even if only for one day.
174
   
 
Article 21(2)(d) of the Trade Union Law, as amended, and the accompanying ministerial 
decision of 2006 include limitations on strikes that are inconsistent with freedom of association.  
By failing to address this inconsistency, and applying or permitting the application of Article 
21(2)d) following the March 2011 general strike, the Government of Bahrain, appears not to be 
fulfilling its commitments under Article 15.1.1 and 1.2 of the FTA.  
 
4. Criminal Sanctions for Illegal Strike-Related Activity 
 
Under Bahraini law, not only are workers subject to dismissal for violating strike bans in key 
Government installations and certain strategic undertakings, such as those discussed above, but 
they can face criminal prosecution linked to their strike-related activity.   
 
Articles 293 – 295 of Bahrain’s Penal Code establish a prison term of up to one year for civil 
servants who join together, in a group of three or more, in a concerted effort to leave their 
employment or to refuse to perform their duties “either in agreement between themselves or 
seeking to achieve a common objective”;175 a prison term of up to six months for civil servants 
who leave employment or refuse to perform duties with the intent of obstructing or disrupting 
business;
176
 and a prison term of up to six months for any person who “instigates” civil servants 
to engage in such unlawful activity.
177
  The Penal Code lists any resulting “disturbance or 
dissension or delays” against “a certain public interest” as one of several possible aggravating 
factors.
178
  Article 297 extends the same penalties to any person, whether or not a civil servant, 
who engages in such activities and is “entrusted with public services” or “who undertakes duties 
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relating to public services or meeting a public requirement, even though he is not a civil servant 
or entrusted with public service.”179   
 
According to the Government of Bahrain, the leadership of the BTS faces criminal charges 
“related to the incitement of an illegal strike and possession of materials encouraging the violent 
overthrow of the government.”180  The petitioners in this case allege that Vice President Jalila al-
Salman and four board members of the BTS were arrested on March 29, 2011, followed by the 
arrests of the BTS Secretary General and President Abu Dheeb within a week.
181
  The Vice 
President of the BTS was detained until released on bail on August 21, 2011.  On September 25, 
she was tried and sentenced to three years imprisonment by the  State of National Safety court, a 
quasi-military judicial body, but that sentence has since been vacated and her case transferred to 
the civilian courts.  The President of the BTS was similarly tried and sentenced to ten years in 
prison also by the Court of National Safety before having his sentence vacated and case referred 
to civilian courts.
182
  To date, however, Mr. Abu Dheeb remains in prison, though on October 21, 
2012, a Bahraini civilian court reduced Mr. Abu Dheeb’s sentence to five years.183  
 
Additionally, there are allegations that both Mr. Abu Dheeb and Ms. Jalila al-Salman were 
tortured while in detention, and the ILO CFA’s June 2012 Interim Report on the case pending 
against Bahrain before the Committee states with respect to the cases of the BTS Vice President 
and President that “the Committee observes with serious concern that Mr. Abu Dheeb remains in 
detention and that the complainant has raised grave allegations that he and Ms. Jalila al-Salman 
have been tortured in jail.”184  The ILO CFA adds that it “expects the Government to provide 
information without delay on the specific steps taken to investigate allegations of torture in 
relation to Mr. Abu Dheeb and Ms. Jalila al-Salman and the outcome of these investigations and, 
in light of the concerns raised by the complainants over Mr. Abu Dheeb’s health, to ensure that 
he immediately receives all necessary medical attention.”185 
 
Additionally, workers from certain private enterprises were threatened with criminal prosecution 
for their role in strike-related activities, including workers from BAPCO and BANAGAS, among 
others.  Such threats may have been based, at least in part, on an understanding that such 
enterprises may constitute “public services” or meet “a public requirement,” triggering the 
Article 297 criminal ban on strike-related activity by their workers;
186
 Article 297 was explicitly 
cited, for example, in the threat against the GFBTU Executive Council, discussed below.    
  
As the ILO CFA noted in the case against Bahrain presently before it, criminalization of certain 
trade union activities, culminating in “the detention of trade unionists for reasons connected with 
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their activities in defence of the interests of workers,” such as a strike, “constitutes a serious 
interference with civil liberties in general and with trade union rights in particular.”187 
 
On March 30, 2011, in the case of BAPCO, a “strategic undertaking” under Bahraini law 
BAPCO’s chief executive stated that the company’s legal department would be reviewing cases 
of absenteeism during the general strike and that “the BAPCO union and the employees could be 
taken to court or to the Labour Ministry.”188  The company later reported that in mid-April, “the 
President of the governing body of the trade union and 11 members were sent to the public 
prosecutor to punish them criminally.”189  In statements to the press, the head of a parliamentary 
committee investigating employee absences, strike activity and reduced productivity at BAPCO 
similarly called for further punishment of the BAPCO trade union leader and others involved in 
the general strike, stating, “Sacking the trade union president doesn’t satisfy us.  We want him to 
be taken to the Public Prosecution for legal action to be taken.  We will not stop here as we work 
to reveal the whole truth to the public on what has gone on at BAPCO.  There are several others 
involved in the general strike during the unrest and protecting those involved.”190          
 
Likewise, in a June 12, 2011, letter, the Joint Committee of Major Companies called for the 
entire GFBTU leadership to resign immediately or potentially face criminal charges related to 
the general strike, pursuant to the Trade Union Law and Articles 293 – 297 of Bahrain’s Penal 
Code.
191
  The letter was directed to the Executive Council of the GFBTU and signed by the 
General Director of BANAGAS, also a “strategic undertaking” under Bahraini law. 
 
Thus, the provisions of Articles 293 – 295 and 297 of the Bahraini Penal Code allowing for 
criminal sanctions for certain union activity, including strikes, undermine freedom of association.  
The Government of Bahrain has not only failed to remedy these shortcomings, but has applied 
the non-conforming legal provisions in its response to the March 2011 general strike.  These 
actions and inaction appear to be inconsistent with Article 15.1.1 and 1.2 of the FTA. 
 
5. Trade Union Law Amendments of 2012 
 
In early August 2012, the Government of Bahrain enacted amendments to the Trade Union Law, 
initially proposed in April 2011, several of which, appear to limit freedom of association under 
the law and appear to be targeted to undermine the GFBTU.  They amend Article 17 of the Trade 
Union Law to categorically ban from union leadership positions anyone convicted of violating 
criminal laws leading to trade union or union executive council dissolution for five years from 
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the date of the final judicial ruling on such dissolution, even when the underlying criminal laws 
are inconsistent with freedom of association, like those criminalizing certain strike-related 
activity.  They also amend Article 8(1) to require that trade unions be “similar” to form a union 
federation, thus prohibiting multi-sectoral federations.  They also amend Article 8(3) to permit 
the Minister of Labor, rather than workers and their organizations, to determine which union 
federation may represent Bahrain’s workers in international fora and in national-level collective 
bargaining.
192
 
 
Recognizing that the amendments could have a profound effect on trade union organizations, 
DOL and USTR urged the Government of Bahrain to consider consulting with worker and 
employer organizations, as well as the ILO, before enacting the legislation.  On December 19, 
2011, DOL and USTR sent a letter to the Government of Bahrain, expressing concern that “these 
changes may be inconsistent with international standards,” in particular principles related to 
freedom of association.
193
   
 
In its complaint to the ILO CFA, the GFBTU characterized the amendment to Article 17 as an 
“obvious attempt to remove the trade union leadership that participated in the political 
mobilization earlier this year,” including trade union leaders from “a number of major 
enterprises, including Gulf Air, GARMCO, BAPCO, and DHL.”194  In response, the ILO CFA 
recalled “that a law which generally prohibits access to trade union offices because of any 
conviction is incompatible with the principles of freedom of association, when the activity 
condemned is not prejudicial to the aptitude and integrity required for trade union office. . . .  It 
requests the Government to amend the legislation to ensure respect for this principle and, in the 
meantime, to confirm that this provision cannot be used for convictions relating to the exercise of 
legitimate trade union activity or the exercise of the right to peaceably demonstrate.” 195 
 
The ILO CFA complaint also asserted that amendment of Article 8(1) would “prohibit the 
establishment of a general labour federation, allowing instead only the establishment of a 
federation of “similar” trade unions.”196  In its Interim Report of June 2012, the ILO CFA 
expressed “deep concern” about the provision’s non-conformity with the principles of freedom 
of association.
197
  The Committee requested the Government of Bahrain to confirm that this 
amendment will not negatively impact freedom of association or the continued functioning of the 
GFBTU and asked the government to take any steps necessary to amend the provision, in full 
consultation with the GFBTU, to clarify that labor federations may be formed freely.
198
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The GFBTU, presently recognized by the ILO as the most representative workers’ organization, 
also asserted in the ILO CFA complaint that the amendment to Article 8(3) of the Trade Union 
Law “is a naked attempt by the government to prohibit the GFBTU from further denouncing 
government-sponsored violations of trade union rights before the International Labour 
Organization (ILO).” 199  While this issue was not addressed in the Interim Report, both the ILO 
Constitution and the ILO CFA have indicated that worker organizations, not the government, 
should select the most representative organization to represent workers in international fora and 
national-level collective bargaining.
200
   
 
The above-cited 2012 amendments to the Trade Union Law weaken the protection of freedom of 
association under Bahrain’s labor law.  By enacting these provisions, the Government appears to 
have acted inconsistently with its commitments under Article 15.1.1 and 1.2 of the FTA.  
 
 
B. Discrimination in Employment and Occupation: Based on Political Opinion and 
Activities and Religion 
 
Bahrain’s Labour Law prohibits retaliation against workers for actions, including political 
activities, outside the workplace,
201
 and the Government of Bahrain, in its response to the AFL-
CIO submission, stated that “the position of the Government of Bahrain is clear, mere 
participation in a demonstration or strike cannot be the basis for dismissal – a dismissal can only 
be on the basis of a violation of the labor code permitting an employer to dismiss a worker.”202  
Bahraini laws, including the Constitution, also establish general principles of equality, with the 
most relevant stating, “People are equal in human dignity, and citizens are equal before the law 
in public rights and duties.  There shall be no discrimination among them on the basis of sex, 
origin, language, religion or creed.”203   
 
Bahraini labor law, however, does not explicitly ban or define discrimination in employment and 
occupation, such as the type alleged by the AFL-CIO submission, workers interviewed by the 
OTLA in the course of its review, and the Article 26 complaint to the ILO.  The labor law is 
silent on the principle concerning the fundamental right of elimination of discrimination in 
employment and occupation enumerated in the ILO Declaration.  The right also is recognized in 
ILO Convention 111, Article 1 of which defines discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion or 
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preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction 
or social origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or 
treatment in employment or occupation.”  The ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) urged Bahrain to amend its labor laws to 
explicitly define and prohibit discrimination in employment and occupation in conformity with 
Article 1 of the Convention [111].”204   
 
The Government of Bahrain has failed to strive to remedy this legal void.  Instead, in the wake of 
the March 2011 general strike, the Government of Bahrain directly invoked and did not prevent 
or discourage employers from conducting discriminatory dismissals based, at least in part, on 
political opinion and religion.  Such action and inaction appear to be inconsistent with the 
Government of Bahrain’s obligation under Article 15.1.1 of the FTA.  
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IV. Conclusions  
 
Based on a review of the events in Bahrain following the March 2011 general strike, it appears 
that trade unionists, in particular union leaders, were targeted for dismissal for their role in 
organizing, supporting, and participating in the strike.  In some cases, union leaders who played 
an important role in organizing the strike were targeted, based on that leadership, for dismissal 
before non-union leaders.  In other cases, like BAPCO, calling for a strike appeared to be the 
decisive factor in whether an employee was fired – the 12 union leaders who admitted to calling 
for a strike were dismissed, while the three who denied involvement were not.   
 
Protected union activity was also explicitly cited as the reason for dismissal in a number of 
termination letters.  Bahrain’s legal framework governing freedom of association is inconsistent 
with international standards in important areas, namely: the ban on trade unions engaging in 
political activities; the ban on strikes in “strategic undertakings” defined to include services 
considered “non-essential” by the ILO; criminal sanctions for engaging in or encouraging strikes 
in the public sector or in undertakings related to public services or public service requirements; 
and the prohibition on public sector union formation.  After the March 2011 general strike, the 
Government of Bahrain actively applied or  did not prevent or discourage employers from 
invoking these laws against organizers, supporters, and participants in the strike.  For example, 
unionists, especially union leaders, were fired for engaging in political activity.  Workers were 
terminated for strike activity in “strategic undertakings.”  Union leaders were arrested, 
prosecuted, and imprisoned or threatened with criminal action for strike-related activity. 
 
The Government of Bahrain has not taken steps to address the aforementioned shortcomings, 
either by implementing the ILO-recommended amendments or otherwise.  Additionally, in 
August 2012, the Government of Bahrain enacted Trade Union Law amendments that weaken 
protection of freedom of association under Bahrain law, namely by banning multi-sectoral labor 
federations; prohibiting individuals convicted of violating criminal laws leading to trade union or 
executive council dissolution from holding union leadership posts; and requiring the Minister of 
Labor to select the federation to represent Bahraini workers in international fora and in national-
level bargaining.   
 
Bahrain law on discrimination in employment and occupation is also inconsistent with 
international standards, as its labor law is silent on the issue.  The Government of Bahrain has 
taken no steps to directly ban discrimination in employment and occupation in its laws.  In 
addition, it also appears that the widespread dismissals in the wake of the general strike of March 
2011 have been carried out in a discriminatory fashion, punishing workers for their religious 
(sectarian) identity and/or for political opinion.  For example, the CSB confirmed that 
disciplinary committees convened by the CSB repeatedly asked workers about their political 
activity.  The BICI found that dismissals based on religious (sectarian) identity had also 
occurred, to the detriment of the Shia population in Bahrain. 
 
Moreover, the reinstatement of all but a few hundred workers dismissed after the March 2011 
general strike has not wholly mitigated the aforementioned shortcomings.  Although the data 
indicate that most dismissals have been largely “resolved” through reinstatements, the 
reinstatement process raises serious concerns, including about failure to reinstate with full back 
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pay due and other remuneration owed or another suitable compensation package and about 
workers’ freedom of association and discrimination based on political opinion and religious 
(sectarian) identity.  For example, there are a number of credible reports of workers being 
required to renounce any political or strike activity as an employment pre-condition and of anti-
Shia discrimination in rehiring, with some enterprises only rehiring Sunni workers.   
 
For these reasons, Bahrain appears to have acted inconsistently with Article 15.1.1 of the FTA by 
not striving to ensure that freedom of association and the elimination of discrimination in 
employment and occupation are recognized and protected in its laws and Article 15.1.2 by not 
striving to ensure that its laws provide for standards consistent with the internationally 
recognized labor rights and not striving to improve those standards. 
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V. Recommendations 
 
A. Cooperative Labor Consultations under Article 15.6.1 of the FTA 
 
According to the OTLA’s Procedural Guidelines for submissions, its public report shall include 
any recommendations made to the Secretary of Labor as to whether the United States should 
request consultations with another Party pursuant to Article 15.6.1 of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, as 
relevant and appropriate.  According to Article 15.6.1, such consultations may be requested 
“regarding any matter arising under this [Labor] Chapter.”  As discussed in this report, the 
allegations raised in U.S. Submission 2011-01 (Bahrain) against the Government of Bahrain, as 
well as subsequent events, directly concern matters under the Labor Chapter and whether the 
Government of Bahrain has upheld its FTA commitments, in particular with respect to freedom 
of association and discrimination in employment and occupation, under Article 15.1.   
 
The Government of Bahrain has instituted mechanisms to address many of the concerns in the 
submission, including the rehiring of workers dismissed in the context of the general strike of 
March 2011.  Nonetheless, important concerns remain.  Therefore, the OTLA recommends to the 
Secretary of Labor that the Government of the United States request Labor Consultations under 
Article 15.6.1 of the FTA to consult with the Government of Bahrain on the matters raised in this 
report.  The OTLA further recommends to the Secretary that in fulfillment of the Parties’ 
obligation to “make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter,” 
the Parties seek during Consultations to develop a plan of action to resolve the matters at issue, 
taking into consideration the recommendations set forth below.  
       
B. Recommendations to the Government of Bahrain 
 
Under Article 15.1 of the FTA, each Party shall strive to “ensure that the labor principles of the 
ILO Declaration and the internationally recognized labor rights set forth in Article 15.7 are 
recognized and protected by its law” and “ensure that its laws provide for labor standards 
consistent with the internationally recognized labor rights set forth in Article 15.7 and … 
improve those standards in that light.”  The OTLA has undertaken review of the present case in 
light of the Article 15.1 commitments, and as a result, makes the following recommendations to 
facilitate compliance by the Government of Bahrain with those commitments:  
 
 Explicitly prohibit discrimination in employment and occupation in its labor law, 
including based on political opinion and religion;  
 
 Amend the ban on trade unions engaging in political activities, consistent with 
international standards; 
 
 Amend the ban on strikes in “strategic undertakings” to ensure  consistency with 
international standards concerning limitations on the right to strike in “essential 
services”; 
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 Amend criminal sanctions for striking or encouraging others to strike in the public 
sector or in undertakings related to public services or public service requirements, 
consistent with international standards;    
 
 Amend the ban on public sector union formation consistent with international 
standards; 
 
 Repeal the ban on multi-sectoral labor federations; 
 
 Amend the ban on individuals who have been convicted of any violations that 
lead to dissolution of a trade union or executive council from holding union 
leadership posts, consistent with international standards;     
 
 Allow workers’ organizations to select the most representative labor organization 
to represent them in international fora and national-level collective bargaining.   
 
 Implement the commitments of the Minister of Labor’s February 2012 plan and 
the Government of Bahrain’s Tripartite Agreement, to the maximum extent 
possible, to ensure reinstatement of workers dismissed in response to the March 
2011 strike to the same or equivalent positions without preconditions or 
discrimination and with back pay due and other remuneration owed or another 
appropriate compensation package;
205
 
 
 Review all criminal cases against trade unionists and union leaders and drop 
outstanding  charges for those whose charges do not consist of advocacy of 
violence and stem from organizing, participating in, or encouraging the March 
2011 general strike, consistent with the BICI recommendation on such cases;
206
 
 
 Refrain from engagement in or support of activities undermining freedom of 
association, in particular against the GFBTU and its leadership;       
 
 Investigate allegations of and sanction, as appropriate, employer acts of 
intimidation and harassment of trade union members and leaders and other similar 
employer actions to weaken workers’ organizations. 
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